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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to study if taxpayers behave in a loss averse
manner when filing their tax returns. This is important for tax design but also
for understanding human behavior in general. The predictions of prospect
theory can be contrasted to those of expected utility theory. We use data
for 3.6 million Swedish taxpayers for the income year 2006. Our research
method is quasi-experimental using a regression kink and discontinuity ap-
proach. We also use an alternative instrumental-variables approach. There is
strong evidence of loss aversion. We estimate the coefficient of loss aversion
using actual behavior and the instrument-variables approach. Our estimate is
very close to the estimates reported in the experimental literature.
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1 Introduction
Behavioral economics is a field that has received a rapidly increasing interest dur-
ing the last decades. The theoretical advances are many. The concept of loss aver-
sion has been recognized in the literature since Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
Most empirical studies of loss aversion have used laboratory experiments with stu-
dent samples and have found that people seem to be loss averse.1
Loss aversion has very strong support from laboratory studies. There is, how-
ever, much less real-world evidence of loss aversion. Pope and Schweitzer (2011)
is an important real-world exception. They study the putting behavior of profes-
sional golf players on the PGA tour. This is an important contribution as it uses
actual data with 2.5 million observations, experienced players, and high stakes.
They find clear evidence of loss aversion. The sample is quite special, however. It
is an open question whether it is possible to generalize the results.
We also study a real-world situation. The setting is, however, more general than
in previous studies. Very few become professional golfers but almost all of us pay
taxes. We study all Swedish taxpayers and their behavior when filing their income
tax returns. We find evidence of loss aversion. The probability of claiming a
deduction is much higher if the taxpayer has taxes due according to the preliminary
tax balance than if the taxpayer will get a refund. This is the first study that we
know of documenting loss aversion among a large general sample of the population
when doing a very common real-world duty.
Previous studies suggest that people who have paid too little in preliminary
taxes actually are less likely to comply than those who have paid too much. Prelim-
inary tax payments should, however, have no effect on tax compliance according
to standard neoclassical theory. Chang and Schultz Jr (1990) find for the United
States that those who owe additional taxes when they file their returns are less
likely to comply than those who have refunds due. They cannot, however, estab-
lish a causal relationship. Persson (2003) is a previous descriptive study using
Swedish data. She reports similar results, people with tax deficits are more prone
to claim dubious deductions. Experimental studies also suggest that advance tax
payments actually matter for compliance.2
These findings are not consistent with expected utility theory. They can, how-
ever, be explained by reference dependence and loss aversion. Reference depen-
dence means that the individual attaches a value to the deviation of an outcome
from a reference point. It is likely that a zero preliminary tax balance is such a
reference point in our particular application.
Some theoretical studies in the area of prospect theory that focus on tax com-
pliance suggest the following line of reasoning:3 Loss aversion implies that the
individual values losses compared to the reference point more than gains of the
1See, e.g., Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Thaler et al. (1997), Schmidt and Traub (2002), Ab-
dellaoui et al. (2007), and Abdellaoui et al. (2008)
2See, e.g., Robben et al. (1990), Schepanski and Shearer (1995), and Copeland and Cuccia (2002).
3See, e.g., Yaniv (1999), Bernasconi and Zanardi (2004), and Dhami and al Nowaihi (2007).
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same amount. An individual with a preliminary tax deficit (more taxes due) will,
therefore, perceive a higher marginal value of extra income than an individual with
a preliminary tax surplus (some taxes will be refunded) of the same amount. Those
with a preliminary tax deficit would consequently be less inclined to comply.
Most empirical studies testing these hypotheses are experimental. The diffi-
culty in getting reliable real-world data on tax compliance is a reason for this. We
use high quality tax return data. Our theoretically founded empirical analysis con-
cerns a particular type of non-compliance. We study the probability that taxpayers
claim deductions for “other expenses for earning employment income”.
These deductions express tax non-compliance in many cases. RSV (2001) re-
ports that almost all audited claimed deductions for “other expenses for earning
employment income” were rejected.4 We simply view this behavior as express-
ing tax aversion. It is not possible to determine if a particular rejected claimed
deduction actually is an attempt to evade taxes or not.
The full dataset we use consists of 3.6 million Swedish taxpayers. The data
concern the income year 2006, the tax assessment year is 2007. We design a quasi-
experiment using a regression kink and discontinuity approach. This regression
technique allows us to eliminate potential problems of endogeneity and selection
in ways that previous empirical studies have not been able to do.
We find behavior to be consistent with loss aversion in the following sense:
Taxpayers who have a preliminary deficit are more likely to claim deductions for
“other expenses” than those who have a preliminary surplus. This is a major contri-
bution of the paper. Loss aversion is the natural candidate for explaining this result.
The deduction probability should, on the other hand, evolve smoothly around zero
preliminary balance according to expected utility theory.
Can we rule out selection? The empirical analysis shows that none of the co-
variates exhibits a similar evolution around zero preliminary balance.
We also use an alternative instrumental variable (IV) approach. Actual local tax
rates are set with two decimals of a percentage. Preliminary local tax rates are, on
the other hand, the actual local tax rates rounded to the closest integer percentages
tax rates. Preliminary balances, therefore, vary exogenously depending on in which
municipality the taxpayer lives. We use the difference between the actual and the
preliminary rates as an instrument when estimating probability models for claiming
a deduction. Our results are confirmed using this approach.
We also estimate the coefficient of loss aversion in our empirical analysis. The
estimate, λˆ = 2.17 for the full sample, is very close to the estimate reported by
Tversky and Kahneman (1992), λˆ = 2.25.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We discuss prospect theory
and its application to tax compliance in Section 2. Section 3 describes our data and
the institutional setting. We then present a simple theoretical model, in which the
taxpayers’ decisions are studied, in Section 4. The model provides predictions
4A more recent follow-up in 2006 drew a random sample of claimed deductions. There were
errors in 93 percent of the cases.
2
for the empirical analysis. Some descriptive results are presented in Section 5.
Section 6 presents the empirical results using the regression kink and discontinuity
approach. The empirical results using the IV-approach and our estimates of the
coefficient of loss aversion are in Section 7. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Prospect theory and tax compliance
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) were the first to define prospect theory.5 The ele-
ments of prospect theory we primarily use are reference dependence and loss aver-
sion. Reference dependence implies that people perceive outcomes as gains and
losses compared to some reference point rather than caring for final states of to-
tal wealth. Loss aversion makes people consider losses as more salient than gains:
“. . . [t]he function is steeper in the negative than in the positive domain; losses loom
larger than corresponding gains.” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991, p. 1039). This
implies that the utility function is kinked at the reference point.
Although the concept of loss aversion was first introduced in risky settings
(and has been proposed to explain parts of observed risk aversion), Tversky and
Kahneman (1991) show that it can also explain behavior in the absence of risk.
The existence of loss aversion has been studied in many experimental settings,
both risky and riskless, mostly using student subjects. Kahneman et al. (1990) con-
ducted one of the first famous experiments in a riskless setting. Half of the subjects
were given a mug, for which they were then asked to give a selling price. The rest
were asked for their willingness to pay for a mug. The price mentioned by the
former group widely exceeded the one mentioned by the latter. This “endowment
effect” has been seen as a test of loss aversion and reference dependence.6
Many experimental studies have followed. Tversky and Kahneman (1992),
Schmidt and Traub (2002), Abdellaoui et al. (2007), and Abdellaoui et al. (2008)
are some studies finding evidence of loss aversion to various extent in within-
subject comparisons. They let the subjects (in most cases rather few university
students) make several choices and concluded that the same individual makes dif-
ferent choices depending on gains or losses.
The subjects in the experiment by Ga¨chter et al. (2007) are car buyers. The
authors make both within- and between-subject comparisons and study both risky
and riskless choices. They find that loss aversion in riskless and risky settings are
strongly positively correlated. Individuals do, however, differ.
Loss aversion has been found to explain behavior also in real-life situations.
The studies are fewer than the experimental. Odean (1998) finds that investors
5The original prospect theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) was later refined by Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) into the cumulative prospect theory with the inclusion of weighting functions of
probabilities. Loss averse behavior, therefore, does not stem solely from the utility function accord-
ing to cumulative prospect theory. It is also determined by the weights put on the probabilities of
different outcomes (Schmidt and Zank, 2005). We deal with riskless decision making in this paper,
implicitly assuming original prospect theory.
6See, e.g., Bateman et al. (1997).
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tend to keep losers and sell winners, the reference point is the purchasing price.
A similar result is found by Genesove and Mayer (2001). They study sellers of
residential real estate. These cases, however, deal with substantial amounts. This
implies that behavior partly could be due to equity constraints, not loss aversion.
Pope and Schweitzer (2011) test for loss aversion using data on professional
golfers’ performance on the PGA tour. They study data on more than 2.5 million
putts and find evidence of loss aversion in a high-stake context. Although golfers
ought to care only about the total score, they seem to consider par as the refer-
ence point when putting. They are more accurate on average when putting for par
(avoiding a loss) than when putting for a birdie (increased winning).
The existence of loss aversion has, therefore, been established. It is another
question how important it is. Loss aversion means that the utility (or value) func-
tion is steeper for gains than for losses, but how much steeper? This can be cap-
tured by the coefficient of loss aversion, λ. There is no overall consensus on how
this should be measured: Tversky and Kahneman (1992) originally defined it as
the ratio of utilities: λ = −U(−1)/U(1), while Ko¨bberling and Wakker (2005)
instead focus on the different slopes: λ = U ′↑(0)/U
′
↓(0). Abdellaoui et al. (2007)
summarize and discuss various methods of measuring λ. Different definitions and
different questions and samples have also given rise to quite disperse estimates
of λ. The most frequently cited estimate is by Tversky and Kahneman (1992):
λˆ = 2.25. Abdellaoui et al. (2007) refer to studies that have found estimates of λ
ranging from 1.4 to 4.8 in risky settings. For the risky setting Ga¨chter et al. (2007)
estimate average λˆ = 2.6 and for the riskless λˆ = 2.0.
Schmidt and Traub (2002) find women to be more loss averse than men. Ga¨chter
et al. (2007), on the other hand, find no significant gender difference once control-
ling for other covariates. They find that loss aversion increases in age and income
but decreases in education.
There are several theoretical papers that use prospect theory when studying tax
compliance. Dhami and al Nowaihi (2007) set up a rigorous model. They make
a complete analysis to explain some “tax-evasion puzzles” and how these puzzles
can be explained by various components in cumulative prospect theory. The most
relevant result for our study is that the evaded amount is increasing in the degree
of loss aversion.
Bernasconi and Zanardi (2004) also model tax evasion in the realm of cumula-
tive prospect theory. Their simulations show that people initially in the loss domain
evade. They will evade sufficiently to enter the gain domain if not caught. People
starting in the gain domain do not evade so much that they risk an income lower
than the reference income.
Some papers focus on how important advance tax payments are to deter tax
evasion in the light of prospect theory. Yaniv (1999) sets up a simple theoretical
model to show how advance payments reduce evasion. The intuition is clear: Those
who have paid too much in advance get a refund. This is considered a gain. The
value function is concave for gains under prospect theory implying risk aversion.
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The value function is, on the other hand, convex for losses under prospect
theory implying risk seeking. A taxpayer has to pay the difference and experiences
a loss if the advance tax payments are lower than actual tax liabilities. Such a
taxpayer might be more willing to take the risk of evading. It is, therefore, clear
that advance tax payments higher than true tax liabilities deter tax evasion.
Elffers and Hessing (1997) also find that advance payments promote compli-
ance. They, however, also point to the fact that withholding too much may make
people feel wrongly treated. This has an opposing effect. They also claim that a
standard deduction would increase tax compliance.
There are also empirical studies that focus on the effects of loss aversion on
tax evasion. Cox and Plumley (1988) find that the share of tax returns needing cor-
rection increases with balance due. Chang and Schultz Jr (1990) also study how
compliance depends on over- and under-withholding at the time of filing using ac-
tual tax return data. Those who owe more taxes when they file their returns comply
less than those who have refunds due. This holds true in all income brackets.
Persson (2003) is a previous descriptive study using Swedish data, which re-
ports results similar to the two above mentioned American studies. She finds that
people with a tax deficit are more prone to claim dubious deductions. Moreover,
all claimed deductions in one region were audited. Those with tax deficits were
less likely to have their claimed deductions approved than those with tax surpluses.
Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2001) have data on self-reported tax evasion and
use them to explain compliance behavior in an experimental setting. They find
evidence of both reference dependence and loss aversion. Schepanski and Shearer
(1995) focus on the effect of withholding in an experimental study where the sub-
jects are undergraduate students. They find that hypothetical taxpayers who are
under-withheld are more likely to underreport income. Robben et al. (1990) also
use students in a hypothetical experiment. They find that having to pay extra tax af-
ter insufficient tax has been withheld leads to more evasion than receiving a refund
after too much has been withheld.
All the above mentioned studies focus on tax evasion as a risky action. The
taxpayer needs to pay a fine in addition to the tax if the taxpayer evades and is
caught. The situation we study is different, however. We study deductions for
expenses that the taxpayer may or may not have had. The deduction may not be
justified even if the taxpayer have had the expense. The reason is that the particular
expense may not be deductable. We cannot, therefore, be entirely sure if it is
tax evasion, tax avoidance, or something else going on. We know, however, that
those who claim the deduction are tax averse. They find it worthwhile to claim the
deduction although it comes at a cost (administrative and/or moral). We, moreover,
restrict our analysis to small claimed deductions. The probability of having these
claimed deductions audited was negligible at the time of the study. And there was
no additional fine for sufficiently small deductions if the deduction was audited and
not accepted.7 Neither were there any fines for large rejected deductions provided
7The tax law has changed since. The threshold value that expenses have to exceed before the
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that the taxpayer could prove that he had had the expense he claimed the deduction
for. The choice to claim a deduction was, therefore, completely without risk.
Some aspects of prospect theory, such as risk aversion in the gain domain and
risk seeking in the loss domain, do not, therefore, apply here. Loss aversion and
reference dependence may, however, be as important in risk-free situations as in
risky ones (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). We identify the impact of loss aversion
on tax compliance by studying how preliminary balances affect deduction behavior.
3 Data and institutional setting
Our entire dataset has data on 4.7 million Swedes, 16–67 years old, filing their tax
returns in 2007 for the income year 2006. We have access to a limited number of
variables: employment income, marginal tax rate, gender, age, claimed deduction
for other expenses for earning employment income, and the preliminary balance in
taxes due.
Assessed employment income includes salaries, social insurance system ben-
efits (such as sickness benefits and parental benefits), and unemployment benefits.
Approved costs for commuting to work are subtracted. Assessed employment in-
come also includes public pensions and occupational pensions. Retirees cannot
be expected to have salary income and, therefore, claim deductions for other ex-
penses. This explains the upper age limit in our sample. Moreover, taxpayers who
had earned business income were not included.
The sequence of events for a taxpayer is as follows:8 Employees pay employ-
ment income taxes at source during income year. Employers transfer the tax pay-
ments to the Tax Agency. Analogous principles apply for capital income taxation
(interest received and paid, dividends, etc).
The Tax Agency sends a preliminary income tax return to the taxpayer in April
the following year (the assessment year). This tax return is based on the statements
of income that the Tax Agency has received from employers, banks, etc. The
Tax Agency also calculates a preliminary balance in taxes due. The preliminary
balance can show a deficit (more taxes due) or a surplus (there will be a tax refund).
The taxpayer can add missing information to the tax return, for instance claiming
deductions. The filing must be done by 2 May. The refund is paid out in June or
August if there is a surplus after the filing. If there is a deficit, the taxpayer has to
pay the taxes due in November or December.9
It is a major event in Sweden when the Tax Agency starts sending out the final
tax statements. Media often fuels the sense of a giant mandatory lottery taking
place. An illustrative example is given by an article in the tabloid Aftonbladet that
tax liability decreases was increased considerably. There is now no longer any point in claiming
deductions of small amounts.
8See also the information from the Tax Agency reproduced in Appendix A.
9The interest paid on surpluses and the interest levied on deficits are independent of the filing
date. Appendix A presents the details that applied during the assessment year 2007. The issues that
Slemrod et al. (1997) discuss for the United States do not arise in the same way in Sweden.
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gave notice to the event.10 The preamble exclaims: “Praise mammon, here comes
the tax refunds” and continues: “If you are lucky the money could be on your
account before Midsummer”. The chance of getting a refund is generally high
since most Swedes have paid too much in preliminary taxes. One could in some
sense describe the event as Christmas for grownups–but there is always a risk that
it is not Santa but the tax collector that is coming down your chimney.
We would like the preliminary balance to be a correct signal from the Tax
Agency to the taxpayer. The preliminary balance should also be exogenous to
the taxpayer. We, therefore, exclude taxpayers for whom the preliminary balance
might not be exogenous.
Taxpayers can ask taxes at source during the income year to be based on their
individual economic situation instead of the default rules. The preliminary balance
can be expected to be endogenous for these taxpayers. We exclude these taxpay-
ers from the sample. In addition, we exclude taxpayers who actively have made
advance tax payments directly to the Tax Agency at their own initiative in the be-
ginning of the assessment year. There are incentives for taxpayers with preliminary
deficits larger than SEK 20,000 to make advance tax payments before mid February
to avoid having to pay extra interest.11 We can expect the preliminary balance to
be endogenous also for these taxpayers. Finally, only taxpayers with “normal” an-
nual employment incomes are included in the sample. We interpret normal annual
employment income to be in the interval SEK 100,000–1,000,000. These selection
criteria leave us with a full sample of 3.6 million taxpayers.12
Why not use the defaults rules? And why make advance payments? One reason
is that taxation at source and the Tax Agency’s preliminary calculations of taxes due
cannot correctly take some taxes into account. This is because the Tax Agency does
not have all the necessary information from the statements of income received from
employers, banks, etc. This concerns the wealth tax (repealed in 2007), capital
taxation of realized capital gains (financial instruments, real estate), and taxation
of business income. Our selection criteria should exclude most taxpayers who pay
these taxes.
So why does not taxation at source exactly match the true tax liability for the
taxpayers? In other words, why do preliminary tax balances deviate from zero?
The way the proportional local government part of the employment income tax is
levied is an important reason. The actual tax rates are set with two decimals of a
percentage (for example, 30.83 percent or 31.12 percent). The Tax Agency decides
on tax tables that employers use when withdrawing preliminary tax for their em-
ployees. These tables are created assuming integer percentages tax rates at source
(for example, 31 percent). Taxpayers who live in municipalities for which tax rates
at source are above the actual rates will tend to pay to much in preliminary taxes.
This will increase their preliminary balances. The opposite applies for taxpayers
10The article is from 22 March 2011 and was published in the smart-phone version of the tabloid
under the name “Tax refund? You can now log in and check!”, our translation.
11See Appendix A for more information on interest rates etc.
12Descriptive statistics for the full sample are presented in Appendix B.
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who live in municipalities with actual rates higher than the rates used at source.13
The progressive central government part of the employment income tax and
the personal exemption, that depended on employment income, are other possible
reasons. Benefits from the social insurance systems are included in employment
income but replacement rates are below 100 percent. Absenteeism may affect the
preliminary balance and so does overtime work. A taxpayer with varying employ-
ment income over the year will tend not to pay the same amount in preliminary
taxes as a taxpayer with the same annual employment income evenly distributed
over the year. Having several employers might also result in that not enough taxes
will be paid at source.
Deviations from a zero preliminary balance may also arise from capital income
taxation. Taxpayers who pay deductable interest and who have not asked for the
preliminary taxation take this into account will tend to have preliminary surpluses.
Assessed employment income was reduced by approved “other expenses for
earning employment income” exceeding SEK 1,000 (USD 150 in 2006) during the
income year 2006. So which types of expenses are approved? Some examples
are expenses for safety equipment, safety clothes, tools, and instruments related to
work not paid for by the employer, expenses for an office if the employer does not
provide one (an office at home is not approved in general), expenses for books and
journals related to work for some occupations if not paid for by the employer, and
expenses for phone calls related to work if not paid for by the employer (not the
phone and not the subscription).
There are some studies of randomly audited claimed deductions for “other ex-
penses”.14 The finding is that 90–95 percent of the claims were not approved.
Claiming such deductions is, therefore, a clear sign of tax aversion. In some cases,
the taxpayer may simply not understand the rules and believe that he is entitled to
the deduction. The taxpayer may take a chance in other cases. Some claimed de-
ductions are, however, clearly not attempts not to comply. This is likely to be true
especially for large claimed deductions. It is difficult to invent very large “other
expenses”. Large deductions are more often accurate than small (Persson, 2003).
Suppose that there is a taxpayer with a large preliminary deficit who claims a
large deduction. One might then suspect that the preliminary balance is endoge-
nous. The taxpayer has in advance planned to claim the deduction to reach a zero
tax balance in the end. This is an important reason for only including relatively
small deductions for “other expenses”. We, therefore, exclude deductions higher
than SEK 20,000.
It was almost without risk to claim small deductions in 2007. The audit prob-
ability was low for small claimed amounts. The taxpayer had only to pay the in-
creased tax liability if the claimed deduction was audited and not approved. There
were no fines for incorrectly claimed deductions of small amounts.
13It is not likely that the local tax rate is set strategically in terms of rounding. It is the sum of tax
rates set by two distinct jurisdictions: the municipality and the county council.
14See RSV (2001) and Persson (2003).
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Figure 1: The share claiming a deduction as a function of the preliminary deficit.
The 3.6 million taxpayers in our full sample exogenously end up having a pre-
liminary surplus or a preliminary deficit. The preliminary balances become more
or less random for taxpayers very close to zero preliminary balance. We, therefore,
focus on taxpayers with a preliminary balance in the interval SEK ±3,000. There
are 1.2 million in this sub-sample that we label the maximum bandwidth sample.15
Our approach is that the deduction behavior of these taxpayers can be viewed as a
quasi-experiment.
Figure 1 shows that the probability of claiming a deduction is higher for taxpay-
ers with a preliminary deficit than for those with a preliminary surplus. The share
claiming a deduction is, moreover, independent of the preliminary balance for those
with a surplus in the maximum bandwidth sample. Slightly less than 4 percent of
those with a preliminary surplus claim a deduction for “other expenses”. Each data
point in the figure represents the share for taxpayers with a preliminary deficit in a
SEK 300 interval. The share is, however, increasing in the preliminary deficit for
those with a deficit.
15Descriptive statistics for the maximum bandwidth sample are also presented in Appendix B. This
sample is based on the preliminary deficit being weighted by the taxpayer’s employment income for
reasons that will be explained in Section 5. Weighting increases the probability of including tax-
payers with high employment income in the sample. Employment income and deduction probability
are positively correlated. This is the reason why the deduction probabilities reported in Table 3 in
Appendix B are slightly higher than those shown in Figure 1.
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4 An illustrative theoretical model
The purpose of this section is to provide predictions for our empirical exercise. We,
therefore, keep the analysis as simple as possible. It is beyond our scope to provide
a complete model of how tax compliance is related to advance tax payments. We,
therefore, do not use the complete prospect theory as presented by Kahneman and
Tversky (1979). Loss aversion and reference dependence are the two components
we use.
Consider a taxpayer i who is about to file the tax return. He receives informa-
tion about his preliminary balance in taxes on the tax return. Taxpayer i has taxes
due if he has a preliminary deficit, Dpi > 0, and will receive a refund if D
p
i ≤ 0.
He compares the preliminary deficit to his reference point.
What should be the valid reference point has been widely discussed.16 Dhami
and al Nowaihi (2007) argue that legal after-tax income should be used as the
reference point. This is related to the idea that the reference point should be based
on rational expectations (Ko¨szegi and Rabin, 2006), i.e., how much the taxpayer
expects to owe or to get refunded.
It is likely that most people perceive their advance payments to be what they
are supposed to pay unless there are special circumstances. We, therefore, assume
that the reference point is a zero preliminary tax balance.17 Taxpayer i has to pay
more taxes if the preliminary balance is a deficit, i.e., Dpi > 0. He, therefore,
experiences himself to be in the loss domain. He will, on the other hand, get a tax
refund if he is in the gain domain, i.e., Dpi ≤ 0.
The value function with reference dependence and loss aversion is:
V (Dpi ) =

−vDpi if Dpi ≤ 0,
−λvDpi if Dpi > 0,
(1)
where λ > 1 is the coefficient of loss aversion.
We follow Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Schmidt and Traub (2002), and Pope
and Schweitzer (2011) and assume a linear value function. This implies constant
marginal values. We disregard strict concavity in the gain domain and strict con-
vexity in the loss domain by this assumption. Utility tends, however, to be almost
linear on very small intervals. A linear approximation should work well since we
limit our analysis to a narrow area around zero.
The taxpayer’s only choice in our very simplified model is whether or not to
claim a deduction of a fixed amount, δ, the same for all taxpayers. What is the
probability that he claims the deduction to reduce his tax liability? The amount δ
is sufficiently small to ensure that the taxpayer perceives to be at no risk of being
audited if he claims the deduction.18
16See, e.g., the discussion in Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2001).
17We present sensitivity analyses allowing the reference points to be endogenous in Section 6.2.
18We abstract from detection risks in our model contrary to previous studies of tax compliance.
Our main results, however, remain valid even if we include a risky choice of evasion.
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Claiming the deduction δ comes at a certain cost, ci. This cost varies across
taxpayers, ci v U [0, c¯]. It may reflect the administrative cost of claiming the de-
duction or the moral cost of doing so if the deduction is not rightful. The deduction
is worth tδ, where t is the constant marginal tax rate.
The taxpayer compares the value of his preliminary tax balance, V (−Dpi ), to
the value if he claims the deduction, V (−Dpi + tδ) − ci. He claims the deduction
if the latter exceeds the former. There are three different domains where the tax-
payer may end up depending on the sign and size of Dpi . The three conditions for
claiming the deduction δ are:
A: ci < λvtδ if D
p
i > tδ,
B: ci < v [tδ −Dpi (1− λ)] if Dpi ∈ (0, tδ],
C: ci < vtδ if D
p
i ≤ 0.
(2)
The value of the deduction in the three cases above are illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2: The value of claiming a deduction in three cases depending on the pre-
liminary deficit.
The assumption of a uniformly distributed cost makes it straightforward to use
the conditions (2) to predict the share of taxpayers deducting at various preliminary
deficits. The threshold cost for claiming the deduction in the loss domain is lower
than in the gain domain as λ > 1. A larger share of the taxpayers should, therefore,
claim δ in the loss domain than in the gain domain. The share of taxpayers who
deduct should, moreover, be independent of the preliminary balance when the bal-
ance is positive. This is because the value function is linear. The same applies for
those with a large preliminary deficit (where Dpi > tδ) who still will have a deficit
even after the deduction. It is only in the middle group, Dpi ∈ [−tδ, 0), where the
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share of taxpayers deducting is expected to increase in the preliminary deficit:
∆ = v [tδ −Dpi (1− λ)] ,
∂∆
∂Dpi
= v(λ− 1) > 0.
(3)
We then predict the pattern for the share of taxpayers claiming the deduction to be
as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Share of taxpayers claiming the deduction depending on the preliminary
deficit.
The pattern in Figure 3 can be summarized as follows:
Prediction 1. The share of taxpayers with a preliminary deficit who will claim the
deduction δ is higher than the share of taxpayers with a preliminary surplus who
will.
Prediction 2. The probability of claiming the deduction δ, as a function of the
preliminary deficit, has the shape as in Figure 3 with kinks at 0 and at D = tδ.
The above connection can then be used to estimate the coefficient of loss aver-
sion, λ. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) originally defined λ = −U(−1)/U(1)
and estimated λˆ = 2.25 using experimental data. Each individual was observed
in both the gain domain and the loss domain. Ko¨bberling and Wakker (2005) in-
stead propose the following definition, which is independent of unit of payment:
λ = U ′↑(0)/U
′
↓(0), which was also informally suggested by Benartzi and Thaler
(1995). The two definitions are equivalent in our setting with a linear value func-
tion. Later studies have used similar techniques to estimate λ. Some have used the
mean and others the median to estimate the aggregate value (see, e.g., Abdellaoui
et al., 2007, and references therein).
12
Our approach is different. We observe many people in the gain domain and the
loss domain. It is, therefore, possible to estimate an aggregate coefficient of loss
aversion. We plot the shares claiming the deduction for each level of preliminary
deficits as sketched in Figure 3. The share claiming the deduction in the gain
domain is: ∫ vtδ
c=0
f(c)dc = X. (4)
We observe the actual share, X , in our data. If we assume the cost to be uniformly
distributed, (4) is easily solved to yield:
vtδ
c¯
= X. (5)
The share claiming the deduction in the part of the loss domain where Di > tδ is:∫ λvtδ
c=0
f(c)dc = Y ⇒ λvtδ
c¯
= Y. (6)
Equations (5) and (6) then gives λ = Y/X . The coefficient of loss aversion is
simply the ratio between the two shares claiming the deduction.
Prediction 3. If ci v U [0, c¯], where ci is the cost of claiming the deduction, the
coefficient of loss aversion, λ, is:
λ =
Y
X
,
where Y is the share deducting in the part of the loss domain where Di > tδ and
X is the share deducting in the gain domain.
We will use this prediction to estimate the coefficient of loss aversion, λ, in
Subsection 7.2.
5 Descriptive results
Let us now return to Figure 1. It shows that a higher share of those with a prelim-
inary deficit claim a deduction for “other expenses” than those with a preliminary
surplus. The share claiming a deduction is independent of the preliminary balance
for those with a surplus as predicted by theory. Slightly less than 4 percent of those
with a preliminary surplus claim a deduction for “other expenses”. The share is,
however, increasing in the preliminary deficit for those with a deficit.
Is this caused by the preliminary balance or is it selection? Plotting the distribu-
tion of individuals over preliminary deficits is a simple graphical test of selection.
If the distribution changes around zero we might have problems with selection.
Figure 4 shows that the distribution does not seem to kink or jump at zero.
We could, however, still have problems with selection that do not show up
in the frequency distribution plot. The individuals slightly below zero could be
13
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Figure 4: Frequency distribution of preliminary deficits.
very different from the individuals slightly above even if the distribution is smooth
around the reference point. We, therefore, need to look closely at how the covari-
ates evolve around the reference point. Suppose that there is selection based on
any of the covariates or selection based on any unobservable factor that is corre-
lated with the covariates. This would show up as a kink or discontinuity around
zero. The pattern in Figure 1 could then be due to selection. If, on the other hand,
all covariates evolve smoothly around zero it suggests that there is a causal effect
of the preliminary balance.
We will here present descriptive tests if the predetermined covariates show
kinks or discontinuities at zero preliminary balance. The formal econometric tests
are presented in Section 6. Employment income is a crucial variable. We consider
this first.
The (blue) diamonds in Figure 5 show the relationship between preliminary
deficit and employment income. The kink slightly below zero preliminary deficit
is very natural. The higher employment income, the more difficult it is to calibrate
the tax payments at source correctly–the deviations will be scaled up in proportion
to the income. Higher employment income will, therefore, move us further away
from zero preliminary balance. This is exactly the pattern we see in the unweighted
version of the relationship.
The unweighted relationship in Figure 5 suggests that we do not have a correct
specification. There is, however, a possible solution to the problem. We might
ask: Is the impact of having SEK 1,000 in preliminary deficit the same for a high-
income taxpayer and a low-income taxpayer? It can be argued that the marginal
utility of claiming a deduction is higher for a low-income taxpayer. There are,
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Figure 5: Employment income as a function of the preliminary deficit.
therefore, good reasons to instead measure the preliminary deficit weighted by
employment income.
Define the weighted preliminary deficit of taxpayer i as:
dpi ≡ (E¯/Ei) ∗Dpi , (7)
where dpi is the weighted preliminary deficit of taxpayer i, D
p
i is the unweighted
preliminary deficit of taxpayer i, Ei is employment income of taxpayer i, and E¯
is average employment income. The weight for the individual taxpayer, E¯/Ei, is
the inverse of the taxpayer’s employment income relative to average employment
income. This will move those with employment income above the average closer to
the reference point. Those with below-average employment income will be moved
away from the reference point. The kink at zero preliminary deficit disappears
when we measure the preliminary deficit weighted by employment income, see the
(red) squares in Figure 5.
The other conditioning variables do not seem to have kinks or discontinuities
at zero preliminary deficit. Figure 6 and Figure 7 show this. It does not matter for
this result whether we use unweighted or weighted preliminary deficits.
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Figure 6: Gender as a function of the preliminary deficit.
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Figure 7: Age as a function of the preliminary deficit.
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6 Estimations
6.1 Baseline models
A main objective in this section is to formally test whether the observed impact of
the preliminary deficit on the probability of claiming deductions is causal and not
due to selection. We follow some of the empirical strategies suggested in the man-
uals for regression discontinuity design (Lee and Lemieux, 2010) and regression
kink design (Card et al., 2009). The empirical tests essentially consist of answering
two questions:
• Does the impact of the preliminary balance on the probability of claiming
a deduction have a statistically significant kink or discontinuity around zero
preliminary balance?
• Can we rule out corresponding statistically significant kinks or discontinu-
ities for the predetermined covariates?
We, therefore, estimate spline models of the following type (additional covari-
ates are suppressed):
∆i = α0 + α1Ii + γ1d
p
i + β1Iid
p
i + i, (8)
where ∆i is an indicator of claiming a deduction, Ii is an indicator for a positive
preliminary deficit, dpi is the (weighted) preliminary deficit, and i is an error term.
The coefficient α0 measures the intercept, α1 measures a potential discontinuity at
the reference point (zero preliminary deficit), and β1 measures a possible kink at
the reference point.
We iterate the estimation over many bandwidths. Bandwidths go from prelim-
inary deficit of SEK ±3,000 at the most and SEK ±500 at the least. We use sym-
metric bandwidths around the reference point (zero preliminary deficit).19 A band-
width of SEK 3,000 means that we only include individuals with weighted prelimi-
nary balances in the range from SEK -3,000 to SEK 3,000. A large bandwidth gives
a larger sample size and, therefore, more precise estimates. A smaller bandwidth,
on the other hand, gives sharper identification but less precise estimates. There are
1.2 million taxpayers in the maximum bandwidth sample (SEK ±3,000) as previ-
ously mentioned. The minimum bandwidth sample consists of 200,000 taxpayers
with weighted preliminary balances in the interval SEK ±500.
We have argued that a linear model is appropriate very close to zero. It is,
however, reasonable to test for more flexible specifications, in particular for larger
bandwidths. We, therefore, also estimate models that include higher order poly-
nomials. We set the maximum polynomial order to 3 and the minimum to 0. The
estimated coefficients of interest are β1 for a possible kink and α1 for a possible
discontinuity.
19We use a logarithmic scale when we iterate over bandwidths. This gives relatively more mea-
surement points at lower bandwidths than at higher bandwidths as seen in, for example, Figure 8.
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The second- and third-order specifications are:
∆i = α0 + α1Ii + γ1d
p
i + γ2(d
p
i )
2 + β1Iid
p
i + β2Ii(d
p
i )
2 + i, (9)
∆i = α0 + α1Ii + γ1d
p
i + γ2(d
p
i )
2 + γ3(d
p
i )
3 +
+ β1Iid
p
i + β2Ii(d
p
i )
2 + β3Ii(d
p
i )
3 + i. (10)
The zero-order specification focus exclusively on a possible discontinuity at zero
preliminary balance:
∆i = α0 + α1Ii + i. (11)
We estimate the four models (8)–(11) for each bandwidth. The optimal model for
each bandwidth is then determined based on minimizing a Schwarz Bayesian cri-
terion (SBC). This information criterion weighs better goodness of fit against lost
degrees of freedom. SBC is a modification of the Akaike information criterion that
punishes lost degrees of freedom harder. We then plot the kink- and discontinuity-
estimates from the optimal model over a range of symmetric bandwidths.
Our primary interest is in the β1 estimate. We base this on the theoretical
predictions from Section 4. The β1 parameter measures the change in the derivative
at the reference point or, in other words, the kink. We are also interested in if there
is a discontinuity at the reference point. This is measured by α1.
Figure 8 reports our estimates of a possible kink at zero preliminary balance.
Optimal models are second-order for bandwidths above SEK 2,500, see the (blue)
thick bracketed line. First-order models for bandwidths down to SEK 800 are opti-
mal. Zero-order models are optimal for smaller bandwidths with some exceptions.
The estimated kink is significant for bandwidths larger than SEK 800 and for
bandwidths around SEK 600. The (red) thick solid line reports the estimated coef-
ficients while the (red) thin solid lines provide the limits of 95 percent confidence
intervals. The figure also shows that the estimated coefficients decrease when the
polynomial order decreases. The estimated coefficients remain stable in a wide
range of bandwidths from SEK 2,500 to SEK 800.
It is also possible that there is a discontinuity in the relationship between the
preliminary deficit and the probability of claiming a deduction at zero preliminary
balance. Figure 9 reports our estimates of this. The estimated coefficients of a
discontinuity at zero are statistically significant for all bandwidths except a few
bandwidths around SEK 600. It is also clear from the figure that the estimated co-
efficients increase when the polynomial order decreases. The estimated coefficients
decrease when the bandwidth decreases for given order of the model.
We now turn to the corresponding estimates for the three covariates. Figures
corresponding to Figure 8 and Figure 9 are presented in Appendix C. We start with
the gender indicator. There is a significant negative kink for large bandwidths when
the optimal polynomial order is one. The optimal order decreases to zero for band-
widths smaller than SEK 1,300. We estimate a significant negative discontinuity
instead of a kink for even smaller bandwidths. The discontinuity-estimates increase
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Figure 8: Kink - estimates of β1.
‐0.00001
‐0.000005
0
0.000005
0.00001
0.000015
0.00002
0.000025
0.00003
2.9 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5
bandwidth, SEK thousands
e s
t i m
a t
e d
  c
o e
f f
i c
i e
n t
‐1
0
1
2
3
o r
d e
r  
o f
  p
o l
y n
o m
i a
l
‐0.005
‐0.0025
0
0.0025
0.005
0.0075
0.01
0.0125
0.015
2.9 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5
bandwidth, SEK thousands
e s
t i m
a t
e d
  c
o e
f f
i c
i e
n t
‐1
0
1
2
3
o r
d e
r  
o f
  p
o l
y n
o m
i a
l
Figure 9: Discontinuity - estimates of α1.
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when the bandwidth becomes smaller and remain significant for bandwidths down
to SEK 750.
The corresponding results for age show decreasing kink-estimates for band-
widths lower than SEK 2,500. The estimates becomes insignificant below a band-
width of about SEK 1,400. The optimal polynomial order is one except for very
large and very small bandwidths. The discontinuity-estimate is insignificant and
stable for bandwidths below SEK 1,900 as long as the optimal polynomial order is
one. These estimates increase and become significant for very small bandwidths
when there is no kink included in the specification.
The results for employment income show that the kink-estimate is negative and
significant for bandwidths between SEK 2,700 and SEK 1,400. The optimal poly-
nomial order is zero for smaller bandwidths. The discontinuity-estimate is only
significant for a narrow range of bandwidths between SEK 1,400 and SEK 1,000.
Let us compare the results for the deduction probability with the corresponding
results for the covariates. The estimated kinks and discontinuities for the covari-
ates jump around much more. The results for deduction probability show a stable
and significant kink for a wider range of bandwidths than for the covariates. The
discontinuity-estimates for the deduction variable decrease when the bandwidth
becomes smaller. It, however, also remains significant in a much wider range than
the estimates for the covariates.
6.2 Sensitivity analysis – placebo kinks and discontinuities
There is a risk that even the smallest and economically insignificant estimates be-
come statistically significant when the sample size is very large. It is, therefore,
relevant to ask whether kinks and discontinuities at the zero reference point are
more pronounced than kinks and discontinuities at other reference points. We,
therefore, present estimates of kinks and discontinuities based on a range of differ-
ent placebo reference points. We let the reference points vary between SEK -3,000
and SEK 3,000. The bandwidth is fixed at SEK 1,000 in all regressions.
The analysis serves two related purposes. The first has to do with causality. The
evidence of causal effects becomes stronger if we find that the kinks and disconti-
nuities in deduction probability are more pronounced for the theoretically predicted
reference points. The second has to do with selection. It speaks against selection
driving the increase in deduction probability around zero if the kinks and disconti-
nuities for the covariates are not more pronounced around zero than elsewhere.
Figure 10 shows the estimated kinks in deduction probability for different
placebo reference points. The kink-estimates peak slightly below zero at a ref-
erence point of about SEK -200. There is a concave increase in the deduction
probability for those with a preliminary deficit, see Figure 1. This generates mod-
erate negative kinks as long as the optimal polynomial order is one. The optimal
polynomial order is zero for reference points above SEK 1,700 further to the right.
The corresponding discontinuity estimates displayed in Figure 11 mirror the
kink estimates. There is a local peak in the discontinuity estimates for reference
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points close to zero. The moderate increases in deduction probability (see Figure 1)
generate large and significant discontinuity estimates further to the right when the
optimal specification does not include a kink.
We conclude that the estimated kinks for different reference points follow a
pattern that is highly consistent with loss aversion based on a reference point close
to zero. Loss aversion does not, in its simplest form, generate a discontinuity in
the deduction probability around zero. The empirical evidence for a discontinu-
ity is also weaker. The largest and most significant discontinuity estimates are at
reference points between SEK 1,700 and SEK 3,000.
We now turn to the corresponding analysis of the covariates. Appendix D has
the figures. We find that neither kink nor discontinuity estimates are more pro-
nounced around the zero reference point than elsewhere for any of the covariates.
We are, therefore, confident to conclude that selection is a very unlikely source
of the increase in deduction probability around zero. It would require very strong
selection on some unobservable factor to produce the pattern we see in Figure 1.
It is hard to come up with a candidate for such an unobservable factor. It is even
harder provided that it also needs to be virtually uncorrelated with gender, age, and
employment income.
6.3 Interpretation and discussion
Figure 12 reports the combined effects of estimated kinks and discontinuities for
the different bandwidths. Suppose that we compare the probability of claiming a
deduction for a taxpayer with a SEK 2,000 in preliminary deficit with and without
the estimated effects of kinks and discontinuities. The figure shows that the dif-
ferences in the probabilities of claiming a deduction is 2.5 percentage points for
bandwidths larger SEK 2,500. The optimal models are here of the second order.
The probabilities differences are about 2 percentage points for smaller bandwidths
down to SEK 800 when the optimal models are of the first order. The optimal
models are of zero order for the smallest bandwidths. The probability differences
here are about 1 percentage point.
The descriptive statistics show that 6.2 percent of those with a preliminary
deficit in the maximum bandwidth sample claim the deduction for “other expenses”.
This give perspective to the estimated difference in the figure. The estimated effect
is substantial.
Let us briefly summarize the econometric results so far. We find clear evidence
of a kink in the deduction probability at zero preliminary balance for a wide range
of bandwidths. Employment income and age do not kink or jump at zero prelimi-
nary balance for smaller bandwidths. The fraction of men shows a very small but
statistically significant jump at zero. This fraction, however, shows even larger
jumps at other reference points.
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Figure 10: Placebo kinks - estimates of β1.
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Figure 11: Placebo discontinuities - estimates of α1.
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Figure 12: The differences in probabilities of claiming a deduction at a SEK 2,000
preliminary deficit with and without estimated kinks and discontinuities.
7 Extensions
7.1 An alternative IV-approach
There is a difference between the actual local employment income tax rate and
the local employment income tax rate used for preliminary taxation at source as
discussed in Section 3. The basic idea in this section is to use this difference as an
instrument for a preliminary deficit indicator when estimating probability models
for claiming a deduction. Figure 13 shows that a higher share of those having
the preliminary tax rate rounded downwards have preliminary deficits than those
having the preliminary tax rate rounded upwards.
The local tax rate is the result of decisions in two separate jurisdictions, the
municipality and the county council (covering several municipalities). It would,
therefore, be extremely difficult for the municipality to set the local tax rate strate-
gically trying to use the rounding principles for taxation at source. This would
require to correctly predict the behavior and response of the county council. It
would be even more difficult for the county council to act strategically in this re-
spect. This would involve predicting the behavior of several municipalities. It
would, consequently, also be very difficult for a taxpayer to predict where to move
to take advantage of a lower preliminary tax rate.
We use two different instruments for the preliminary deficit indicator in the IV-
analysis: i) the difference between the preliminary and actual local tax rates and ii)
the interaction between the first instrument and employment income. The second
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Figure 13: Relative frequency distributions for taxpayers with preliminary tax rates
rounded upwards and downwards.
instrument can be interpreted as the impact of the rounding on the preliminary
balance. The IV-analysis uses the full sample of 3.6 million taxpayers. The OLS
and baseline IV-estimate use the standard set of controls, see the notes to Table 1 for
details. The models with interacted treatments also include all relevant interacted
controls and instruments.
The upper part of Table 1 reports the estimation results for the probability of
claiming a deduction. The OLS estimate shows that having a preliminary deficit
increases the probability of claiming a deduction by 2.0 percentage points. This
estimate cannot, however, be causally interpreted since preliminary deficit may be
correlated with the probability of claiming a deduction.
The causal estimate given by the IV-estimation suggests an even stronger effect.
We estimate an impact of 5.0 percentage points. The overidentification test does
not reject the validity of the instruments.
The remaining columns in Table 1 report IV-estimations that test for possible
differences between different sub-groups in our sample. We conclude that there are
no significant gender differences from the estimation reported in column 3. Col-
umn 4 in the table presents the results from a corresponding estimation where we
test if the response of those older than 40 years differ from the estimated response
of younger taxpayers. The result suggest that there are no such differences. We do
find, on the other hand, that there is a significant difference in response between
those with employment income higher than SEK 250,000 (the median income is
SEK 250,200) and those below this threshold. The response of those with relatively
high income is significantly stronger.
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Table 1: The probability of claiming a deduction and the coefficient of loss aver-
sion, IV-approach, full sample.
1 2 3 4 5
OLS IV IV, gender IV, age IV, income
preliminary deficit, 0.020 0.050 0.048 0.055 0.044
indicator: (0.000) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007)
preliminary deficit, indicator, interacted with:
man, indicator 0.009
(0.013)
old (age>=40), indicator -0.005
(0.013)
high income (> SEK 250,000), 0.031
indicator (0.013)
overidentification test, p-value 0.798 0.356 0.708 0.442
λˆ 1.43 2.17
(0.007) (0.184)
λˆ, men / old / high income 1.97 2.00 2.21
(0.212) (0.208) (0.226)
λˆ, women / young / low income 2.91 2.66 3.54
(0.404) (0.382) (0.626)
p-value, t-test 0.038 0.130 0.046
Notes. Number of observations: 3,610,972.
Heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors within parentheses.
Baseline instruments: the difference between actual local tax rate and preliminary local
tax rate and the tax rate difference times employment income.
Baseline covariates: age, age2, employment income, (employment income)2, gender.
25
7.2 Estimating the coefficient of loss aversion
The coefficient of loss aversion (λ) can be expressed in a simple way according to
Prediction 3. It is the share of deducting taxpayers in the loss domain (with suf-
ficiently large preliminary deficits) divided by the share of deducting taxpayers in
the gain domain. We use the IV-estimation reported in Table 1, column 2, to cal-
culate these shares. Our estimates of λ based on the IV-estimations ignore that the
share that claims a deduction does not immediately move to a higher stable level
when entering the loss domain. This will give a downward bias to our λ-estimates.
The reason is that the average deduction probability in the whole deficit region
is slightly lower than the average deduction probability on the level further to the
right. This is clear from Figure 3. The results from Table 1 are, therefore, conser-
vative estimates of the coefficient of loss aversion.
We estimate the probability of claiming a deduction for a taxpayer with a pre-
liminary surplus and average values of the covariates to 4.23 percent in our full
sample of 3.6 million taxpayers. The standard error of this estimate is 0.001. The
corresponding probability of claiming a deduction for an average taxpayer with a
preliminary deficit is 9.19 percent, with a standard error 0.005. Our estimate of
loss aversion is given these assumptions:
λˆ =
Yˆ
Xˆ
=
9.19
4.23
≈ 2.17. (12)
We calculate the standard error of this ratio using the delta method. The result-
ing estimate of the standard error is 0.184.
The lower part of Table 1 presents our estimates of the coefficient of loss aver-
sion, λˆ. We estimate λ to be higher for women than for men, 2.91 compared to
1.97. This difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level according to a
t-test. This test takes potential covariances between the estimated parameters into
account. It is possible to do this as we have estimated the response of men and
women in the same model.
The estimated λ for young is higher than that of old. This difference is, how-
ever, not statistically significant at the 5 percent level according to the t-test. There
is, on the other hand, a statistically significant difference in the estimated λ’s be-
tween those with relatively high income and those with relatively low income. The
estimated λ of taxpayers with low income is much higher. This is surprising as the
estimated effect of preliminary deficit was significantly higher for the high-income
group. But the λ-estimate is a ratio so we need to consider differences in both the
numerator and the denominator. The high λ-estimate for the low-income group
is because the deduction probability for those with a preliminary surplus is only
about 1.7 percent.
Our estimates are all in the range which has been reported in the literature.
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) report λˆ = 2.25. Our overall estimate, λˆ = 2.17, is
very close to this. Abdellaoui et al. (2007) cite various studies where the estimates
vary between 1.4 and 4.8.
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Our finding that women are more loss averse than men is similar to that of
Ga¨chter et al. (2007). Their effect vanishes though when controlling for many
covariates. We have access to very few covariates. This might explain why our
results differ.
Our result that low income taxpayers are more loss averse than those with high
income is contrary to Ga¨chter et al. (2007)’s findings. They, however, also con-
trol for education which is negatively correlated with loss aversion. Some of our
income results might depend on education differences as education is strongly cor-
related with income.
8 Concluding remarks
We study if taxpayers behave in a loss averse manner when filing their tax returns.
This is important for tax design. It is also important for understanding human
behavior in general. We test the predictions of prospect theory in our empirical
analysis. The dataset consists of 3.6 million Swedish taxpayers for the income
year 2006. The research method is quasi-experimental using a regression kink and
discontinuity approach.
We find behavior to be consistent with loss aversion. Taxpayers who have a
preliminary tax deficit are more likely to claim deductions for “other expenses for
earning employment income” than those who have a preliminary surplus. We find
a significant change at zero preliminary deficit. The empirical analysis also makes
clear that none of the covariates shows a similar evolution around zero preliminary
deficit. We can, therefore, rule out selection. Loss aversion is the obvious candidate
for explaining the result.
We also use an alternative IV-approach to strengthen the causal interpretation.
Actual local tax rates on employment income are set with two decimals of a per-
centage (for example, 30.83 percent). Preliminary taxation at source, on the other
hand, is based on actual tax rates being rounded to the closest integer percentages
tax rates (for example, 31 percent). Taxpayers will tend to pay to much in pre-
liminary taxes if they live in municipalities where tax rates at source are above the
actual rates. The preliminary balances will, therefore, tend to be in surplus. The
opposite applies to taxpayers who live in municipalities with actual rates above the
rates used at source. We use the difference between the actual and the preliminary
rates as an instrument for a preliminary deficit indicator. This indicator is used
to estimate probability models for claiming a deduction. Our previous results are
confirmed using this approach.
We also estimate the coefficient of loss aversion. Our estimate, λˆ = 2.17 for
the full sample, is very close to the estimate reported by Tversky and Kahneman
(1992), λˆ = 2.25. We have a different approach to estimating this coefficient
compared to previous studies. This literature usually uses experimental data from
samples of students while we use real-world data for all taxpayers in a country. We
still arrive at results very close to those previously reported.
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We believe that our findings are important for several reasons. They are impor-
tant for tax design. The results suggest that tax compliance is likely to increase if
preliminary balances are positive instead of negative.
The main contribution, however, is that this is the first study to identify loss
aversion among millions of people doing a very common real-world duty. This is
also the first study to our knowledge that can rule out selection. There are many
studies reporting empirical evidence of loss aversion. Previous studies have, how-
ever, used experimental settings, very special samples, or weak identification. The
hypothesis that people are loss averse is strongly supported by our study.
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Appendix A More on the institutional framework
The Tax Agency provides a lot of information to taxpayers. The information is
very detailed as is clear from this excerpt from SKV (2009).
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Everyone receiving an income is required to fi le a 
tax return (self assessment) the year after the income 
year. The income year is the year in which the income 
(e.g. wages or pensions) is paid out and your employer  
– or whoever pays out your pension – makes a tax de-
duction for it.
At the beginning of April, 
the Tax Agency will send you: 
• A tax return form
Everyone required to declare income will receive a tax 
return form, ‘Inkomstdeklaration’. Many particulars on 
the form have already been fi lled in by the Tax Agency 
(Skatteverket).
• An income specifi cation
This is a list itemising the income statements (kon troll -
upp gif ter) sent to both you and the Tax Agency.
• A preliminary tax estimate
You will also get a preliminary estimate of your tax. 
It will be based on the information the Tax Agency 
has fi lled in on your tax return.
• Payment slips
In addition, you will be sent tax payment slips that you 
can use if you need to pay more tax.
Assessment year (the year after the income year) 
Filing an income tax return
January
In January, you will be sent income sta te -
ments for your earnings the previous year. 
Your employer sends the income statement 
both to you and to the Tax Agency. You will be 
sent your tax return form in April.
May
By 2 May at the lat est the 
Tax Agency must have re-
ceived your income tax re-
turn.
January–De cem ber 
All the income you have received 
during this year must be declared 
in the following year’s income tax 
return.
Income year
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2 May
by 24.
00If 2 May is a Saturday or Sunday, 
tax returns must be submitted by 
Monday at the latest.
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Kostnadsersättningar
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tala egenavgifter för
SK
V 
20
00
 K
 u
tg
åv
a 
18
 0
8-
10
Region Kontor Sektion Grupp Perso
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2009
Avdrag - Tjänst
Inkomster - Kapital
Förlust fondandelar. 
Förlust enligt blankett 
K4 avsnitt A, K10, 
K12 avsnitt B
och K13.
Ränteutgifter m.m. 
Förlust enligt 
blankett K4 
avsnitt C.
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00
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12
27
1
2
3
6
4
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K13
03
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15
16
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22
www.skatteverket.se
Person-/Organisationsnummer
Skriv under på 
baksidan!Fåm
ansföretag
FÅMNRV
Kontrollera beloppen som Skatteverket 
fyllt i. Om ett belopp är fel, stryk det och
 fyll i rätt belopp 
i den vita rutan. Fyll i totalbeloppet, dvs.
 summan av det ifyllda beloppet och din
 ändring. 
Skatteupplysningen
Förvaltningsutgifter
Du får avdrag endast för den del som 
överstiger 1 000 kr. Fyll i totalbeloppet
. 
(Skatteverket minskar automatiskt ditt 
avdrag med 1 000 kr.)
Resor till och från arbetet 
Du får avdrag endast för den del som 
överstiger 8 000 kr. Fyll i totalbeloppet
. 
(Skatteverket minskar automatiskt ditt 
avdrag med 8 000 kr.)
HB
8
Förlust ej marknadsnoterade fondandela
r.
Förlust enligt blankett K4 avsnitt D, 
K9, K10A, K12
avsnitt E och 
K15A/B.
Förlust enligt blankett K5 och K6
Förlust enligt blankett K7 och K8 
83
85
88
Avdrag - Kapital
53
Hos Skatteverket
senast 4 maj
54
61
81
Belopp i kronor
Belopp i kronor
Underlag för fastighetsskatt5
Tomt för småhus/
småhus under 
uppförande        1,0 %
Övriga utgifter
Du får avdrag endast för den del som 
överstiger 5 000 kr.  Fyll i totalbeloppet
. 
(Skatteverket minskar automatiskt ditt 
avdrag med 5 000 kr.)
Allmänna avdrag
Utländsk försäkring - Avkastningsskat
t
Skatteunderlag för 
kapitalförsäkring
Skatteunderlag för
pensionsförsäkring
7
62
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Pensionssparande m.m.
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43
Småhus
hel avgift        0,75 %
Underlag för fastighetsavgift
Tillfälligt arbete, dubbel bosättning och 
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Småhus
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I "Dags att deklarera" får du svar 
på de flesta av dina frågor.
50
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Ränteinkomster, 
utdelningar m.m. 
Vinst enligt blankett 
K4 avsnitt C.
Överskott vid uthyrning av privatbostad
Vinst fondandelar. 
Vinst enligt blankett 
K4 avsnitt A och B, 
K10, K10A, K12 
avsnitt B och K13.
Vinst ej marknadsnoterade 
fondandelar. Vinst enligt
blankett K4 avsnitt D, 
K9, K12 avsnitt E 
och K15A/B.
Vinst enligt blankett K5 och K6.
Återfört uppskov från blankett K2.
Vinst enligt blankett K7 och K8 
Declare you ncome 
on the Internet or by phone
Most taxpayers can fi le their tax returns on the Internet. Visit 
www.sk tteverket.se to fi nd out who can use this  service and 
how to proceed it. 
To fi le your tax retur  o  the Internet you go into  
www.skattev rket.se (E-tjänster  Inkomstdeklaration).
If you don’t need to make any changes, you can approve your 
 income tax return by telephone (020-567 100) or via sms (711 44).
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2009-08-03
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9999-99 999 99
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Skattekontoret Wistad
Box 122
123 45 Wistad
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Skatteupplysningen 0771-567 
567
Kommunal skattesats %
Kommunalskatt
Landstingsskatt
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Taxerad förvärvsinkomst
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12,27
29,85
Wistad
580303-2805
01 84 01 01 21 P01 99
25 % av allmän pensionsavgif
t
Grundavdrag
Everyone has a tax account
The tax account provided by the Tax Agency 
shows your preliminary tax fi gure based on 
 income statements as well as your own tax 
 payments, your fi nal tax fi gure and other  details.
Tax refund
If you are salaried or a pensioner you can receive your 
tax refund by June. But to do this you must 
• fi le your tax return via the Internet, phone or sms 
and
• have specifi ed a bank account for refund of tax.
How to fi ll out the form:
August – September
By September at the latest, fi nal tax 
 statements and statements of account are 
sent out to most people who have sent in 
an income tax return and who have not 
 received a fi nal tax statement in June. 
Those who have paid too much tax will 
now get their money back.
December
By mid-December at the latest, 
fi nal statements and statements of 
account are sent out to those who 
did not get them before. Those 
who have paid too much will now 
get their money back.
Check that all income statements are included in 
the specifi cation sent to you and that the amounts 
are correct. Most of the in for ma tion in the specifi ca-
tion is also fi lled in on your tax return form.
Are the amounts fi lled in on the tax return form 
correct and is all the information included?
File your tax return via the Internet with security 
code, by phone, by sms – or sign the form 
and send it in!
Correct what is not correct! Add any missing 
 information! You can do this on the Internet with 
electronic legitimation or on the form. 
Sign (electronically or on the form) 
and send it in! 
YES
NO
DONE! DONE!
June
In June a fi nal tax statement (sluts kat te -
be sked) and a statement of account (kon to -
ut drag) are sent out to most employees and 
pensioners w o hav  fi led a tax return, via 
the Internet, by phone or by sm nd who are 
due to get a  refund. This applies only to those 
who have specifi ed a bank account.
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The tax account: interest rates
The taxpayer’s tax account is interest bearing. During the assessment year 2007,
a surplus on the tax account earned a tax exempt interest of 1.35 percent from
13 February 2007. This interest rate was increased to 1.8 percent from 1 July 2007.
The increase was decided 25 June 2007. Interest was earned until the surpluses was
refunded.
The taxpayer has to pay interest on deficits on the tax account. The interest
paid on tax account deficits is not deductable. The interest rates were as follows
during the assessment year 2007:
from deficit interest rate,
percent
13 February <=20000 0
20001-30000 3
>30001 3.75
4 May <=30000 3
>30000 3.75
1 July <=30000 4
(rate increase) >30000 5
due date <=10000 4
>10000 19
Preliminary employment income taxes at source
There were nine tables for preliminary employment income taxes at source for in-
teger percentages local government income tax rates from 29 percent to 37 percent
in 2006. Tax payers facing local government income tax rates with decimals of a
percentage ≤ .50 pay preliminary income taxes according to the closest downward
integer percentage table, while taxpayers facing local government income tax rates
with decimals of a percentage> .50 pay preliminary income taxes according to the
closest upward integer percentage table.
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Appendix B Descriptive statistics
Table 2: Descriptive statistics, full sample.
preliminary preliminary
deficit surplus all
number of observations 810,690 2,800,282 3,610,972
deducting, fraction 0.062 0.044 0.048
deduction, SEK, conditional 4,716 3,559 3,894
(4,324) (3,342) (3,692)
preliminary balance, SEK, unweighted -10,757 6,553 2,667
(51,232) (6,762) (26,017)
employment income, SEK 279,770 269,296 271 648
(135,523) (115,198) (120,140)
men, fraction 0.48 0.49 0.49
age, years 46.8 42.0 43.1
(12.5) (12.1) (12.3)
Note. mean (standard deviation)
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics, maximum bandwidth sample.
preliminary preliminary
deficit surplus all
number of observations 370,929 822,686 1,193,615
deducting, fraction 0.061 0.042 0.048
deduction, SEK, conditional 4,212 3,714 3,910
(3,813) (3,403) (3,578)
preliminary balance, SEK, unweighted -1,289 1,611 710
(1,140) (1,153) (1,767)
preliminary balance, SEK, weighted -1,263 1,582 698
(856) (847) (1,567)
employment income, SEK 277,908 276,876 277 197
(130,544) (119,073) (122,753)
men, fraction 0.49 0.50 0.49
age, years 44.9 43.1 43.7
(12.5) (12.3) (12.4)
Notes. mean (standard deviation)
Sample selection criterion: weighted preliminary balance in the interval ± SEK 3,000.
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Figure 14: Number of observations at different bandwidths.
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Appendix C Estimates for covariates
Figure 15: Kink - estimates for employment income.
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Figure 16: Jump - estimates for employment income.
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Figure 17: Kink - estimates for gender.
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Figure 18: Jump - estimates for gender.
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Figure 19: Kink - estimates for age.
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Figure 20: Jump - estimates for age.
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Appendix D Placebo estimates for covariates
Figure 21: Kink - placebo estimates for employment income.
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Figure 22: Jump - placebo estimates for employment income.
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Figure 23: Kink - placebo estimates for gender.
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Figure 24: Jump - placebo estimates for gender.
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Figure 25: Kink - placebo estimates for age.
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Figure 26: Jump - placebo estimates for age.
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